Institutional Lock-in Within the Field of Investment Arbitration by Bjorklund, Andrea K. & Druzin, Bryan H.
  
 
707 
INSTITUTIONAL LOCK-IN WITHIN THE FIELD OF 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
 
ANDREA K. BJORKLUND* & BRYAN H. DRUZIN** 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This Article examines the likelihood of the emergence of an alter-
native center for investment arbitration—a very much debated, if 
not favored, option in some policy circles.  We argue that given the 
current market dominance of the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), the emergence of institutional 
competition from other regions of the world is constrained by net-
work effects. 
Network effects arise when the value that consumers derive from 
a good increases as others also use the good.  (Language is the classic 
example.)  As more users adopt the good and its utility is enhanced, 
additional consumers flock to the good, creating positive feedback.  
When a market has settled upon a single standard, the market is said 
to have “tipped.”  This gives rise to a monopoly-type situation that 
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prevents potential rivals from successfully challenging the market 
dominance of the prevailing standard, creating what is known as 
“institutional lock-in.” 
After explaining the concept of institutional lock-in, we explore 
its salience in the investment arbitration realm.  We find that this 
model is robust and its impact discernible in the current investment 
arbitration environment.  Notwithstanding this finding, certain ex-
ogenous events could substantially reduce or even annihilate this 
effect.  To this end, potential “disruptive events”—such as the Euro-
pean Union’s push for an investment “court,” potential competition 
from the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”) or other arbitra-
tion centers, and unforeseen legislative changes—are explored.  
These events could undermine the market dominance of ICSID and 
trigger either a large-scale coalescence around an alternative institu-
tion or, rather more likely, the parceling out of investment arbitra-
tion among multiple competitors until the market again coalesces 
around a new standard.  However, we conclude that in the absence 
of a strong exogenous shock, the institutional lock-in of ICSID will 
be difficult to dislodge.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/3
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 In many ways investment arbitration is a unique form of arbitra-
tion in that it involves private entities settling legal disputes with 
state actors.  It is also a relatively new form of arbitration.  It only 
gained wide usage starting in the late 1960s when the first bilateral 
investment treaties (“BITs”) containing investment arbitration were 
created,1 and the first investment treaty arbitration award was not 
issued until 1990.2  Yet investment arbitration has now become the 
chief means of dispute settlement between foreign investors and 
states—it is how private actors redress their legal rights beneath the 
awesome shadow of state power. 
 Presently, the world of international investment arbitration is 
dominated by a single center for dispute resolution—the Interna-
tional Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), 
which is headquartered in the United States in Washington D.C.  It 
                                               
 1 Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Commercial and Investment Arbitration: How Different are 
They Today? 28 ARB. INT’L 577, 577-78 (2012).  Investment arbitrations also were fa-
cilitated when the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States (i.e., the ICSID Convention), a World Bank 
sponsored multilateral treaty, was opened for signature in 1965.  Investment 
arbitration can involve an arbitration based on the violation of an investment treaty, 
it can be based on an investment contract between a host state and a foreign 
investor, or it can arise from the investment law of the state hosting the investment.  
See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States art. 25, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270 [hereinafter Conven-
tion on the Settlement of Investment Disputes].  
 2 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/87/3, Final Award, (June 27, 1990), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/ic-
sid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C140/DC676_En.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PK9N-PFX8]. 
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is, in practice, an institutional near-monopoly in the field of invest-
ment arbitration.3  This Article examines the likelihood of the emer-
gence of an alternative center for investment arbitration—a very 
much debated, if not favored, option in some policy circles—from a 
law and economics perspective, an analytical tack that provides a 
great deal of explanatory power, as we will show. 
 We argue that given the current market dominance of ICSID, the 
emergence of institutional competition from other regions of the 
world is constrained by network externalities (i.e., what is known as 
network effects in the literature).4  Network effects arise where the im-
plicit value of a service (or product) increases as the number of other 
agents using the same service grows.  As more users use the service 
and its utility is enhanced, additional consumers flock to the service, 
and on it goes, creating a positive feedback loop. (The process is also 
captured by the concept of increasing returns.)5  When a market has 
settled upon a single standard for the service with all competitors 
eliminated or significantly marginalized, the market is said to have 
“tipped.”6  Once a market has tipped, it creates a monopoly-type sit-
uation that prevents potential rivals from successfully challenging 
                                               
 3 The term “monopoly” here is carefully deployed.  ICSID may be understood 
as a monopoly in that the network externalities that inhere in the market for invest-
ment arbitration inhibit market competition, creating barriers to entry.  For all in-
tents and purposes, the dynamic functions as a monopoly.  ICSID is not, however, 
a monopoly in the formal sense of a firm strategically engaging in anti-competitive 
practices. 
 4 We use the terms “network externalities” and “network effects” 
interchangeably throughout the Article. 
 5 For the foundational literature on network effects and its focus on path de-
pendence, see Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 
332 (1985); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and 
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985); W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technolo-
gies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116 (1989); W. 
Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, 262 SCI. AM. 92 (1990); W. BRIAN 
ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY (1994); S. J. 
Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 205 (1995); see also Paul A. David, Why are Institutions the ‘Carriers of His-
tory’?: Path Dependence and the Evolution of Conventions, Organizations and Institu-
tions, 5 STRUCTURAL CHANGE & ECON. DYNAMICS 205 (1994). 
 6 William Page & John E. Lopatka, Network Externalities, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS VOLUME I: THE HISTORY AND METHODOLOGY OF LAW AND 
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the market dominance of the prevailing standard.  The market for 
investment arbitration, we argue, has tipped. 
 Our argument draws on the concept of institutional lock-in, first 
put forward by Douglass C. North, whose work in the area won him 
a Nobel Prize in 1993.7  North argues that institutional lock-in occurs 
because the constitutive nature of institutions—what North refers to 
as “the interdependent web of an institutional matrix”—generates 
massive increasing returns.8  This process of increasing returns 
causes institutional frameworks to gradually become deeply en-
trenched over time and, as a consequence, more difficult to dis-
lodge.9  Consequently, institutions that already enjoy a foothold 
“generate powerful inducements that reinforce their own stability 
and further development.”10  Because ICSID presently dominates 
the investment arbitration service world, which can be understood 
as a market for specific legal dispute resolution services, network 
effects are being generated that bolster and further entrench this 
market dominance, stymieing and precluding competition from 
                                               
ECONOMICS 952, 960 (Boudwijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).  For the 
concept of tipping, see also THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND 
MACROBEHAVIOR 92–94, 98–99 (1978). 
 7 See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 73–104 (1990) (positing that institutional development may produce 
a path-dependent pattern of development over time); see also Paul Pierson, Increas-
ing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251 (2000) 
(arguing political institutions are particularly vulnerable to this process); Paul 
Pierson, Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes, 14 STUD. 
AM. POL. DEV. 72 (2000); Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve: Insight from Com-
parative Historical Analysis, in COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS IN THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 208–40 (James Mahoney & Dietrich Rueschemeyer eds., 2003) (discussing 
the “feedback mechanisms” that steer institutional and policy trajectories over 
time). 
 8 NORTH, supra note 7, at 95.  North, however, defines institutions in a very ex-
pansive manner.  See NORTH, infra note 11. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Paul Pierson, Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring in 
Affluent Democracies, in THE NEW POLITICS OF THE WELFARE STATE, 410, 415 (Paul 
Pierson ed., 2001). 
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elsewhere.  As a result, the market for investment arbitration ser-
vices is, we argue, experiencing a form of institutional lock-in.11 
 While we feel this model is robust and its impact discernible in 
the current investment arbitration environment, certain exogenous 
events could occur that may substantially reduce or altogether anni-
hilate this effect.  The possibility of such “disruptive events” does 
not contradict the model; rather, it renders the model more nuanced.  
Network effects suggest that the robust emergence of an alternative 
center for investment arbitration would prove extremely difficult; 
however, given several unknown factors, it remains a possibility.  
For example, the European Union has succeeded in establishing a 
“permanent” court and “Appellate Body” in the texts of the EU-
                                               
 11 The definition of an “institution” as North uses it, however, bears explanation.  
While the idea encompasses conventional organizations such as universities, trade 
unions, churches, and corporations, North understands “institutions” in a very ex-
pansive sense: “Institutions are the rules of the game in society or, more formally, 
are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.” NORTH, supra 
note 7, at 3.  Institutions, North informs us, “include any form of constraint that 
human beings devise to shape human interaction . . . . They can be either . . . formal 
constraints—such as rules that human beings devise—and informal constraints—
such as conventions and codes of behaviour.  Institutions may be created, as was 
the United States Constitution; or they may simply evolve over time, as does the 
common law.”  Id. at 4.   
 In this sweeping sense, institutions may be better understood as “a special type 
of social structure that involves potentially codifiable and . . . normative rules of 
interpretation and behavior.”  Geoffrey M. Hodgson, What are Institutions?, 11 J. 
ECON. ISSUES 1, 4 (2006).  They are frameworks wherein “[m]embers of the relevant 
community share tacit or explicit knowledge of these rules.”  Id. at 3.  This broad 
understanding of institutions can be traced back to Thorstein Veblen in the early 
literature on institutionalism—Veblen defined institutions as the “settled habits of 
thought common to the generality of men.”  Thorstein Veblen, The Limitations of 
Marginal Utility, 17 J. POL. ECON. 620, 626 (1909).  While North clearly distinguishes 
between organizations and institutions, organizations can be understood as a sub-
set of institutions.  See 1 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL ECONOMY: A–K 535 (Phillip 
Anthony O’Hara ed., 1999).  We use the term “institution” here in its narrower and 
more conventional sense (i.e., as a hierarchical organizational arrangement that reg-
ulates a form of human interaction) in this particular case, disputes related to in-
vestment arbitration.  Thus, we diverge from North in that we are not so much 
concerned with organizations becoming locked into potentially sub-optimal rules 
and norms—rather, we are interested in how actors become locked into an organi-
zation itself—i.e., ICSID.   
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Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (“FTA”)12 and the Comprehensive 
Trade and Economic Agreement between Canada and the European 
Union (“CETA”)—and has proposed that a similar body be included 
in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“T-TIP”).13  
 The question is which institution (or institutions) will host these 
bodies, and whether these agreements ever enter into force.  At pre-
sent, the European Union has proposed either the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration (“PCA”) or ICSID as administrators in both the T-TIP 
and the EU-Vietnam FTA, but ICSID alone has been chosen as the 
administering institution in CETA; however, in principle, any num-
ber of institutions may be selected in future agreements.  Whether 
or not the European Union becomes a party to ICSID Convention 
might play a role in ICSID’s continued dominance.  Also considered 
are regional preferences, for instance, Singapore has taken initiatives 
to establish itself as a premier center for commercial arbitration and 
has recently released rules specific to investment arbitration.14   
 The Singapore International Arbitration Centre, some similar in-
stitution, or even a combination of institutions, may yet succeed in 
displacing the market dominance of ICSID.  Such exogenous factors 
would short-circuit the network effect pressures in the market for 
investment arbitration, as would other potentially disruptive 
events.  The conclusion we reach is that network effects are indeed 
currently at play and powerfully reinforce the market dominance of 
ICSID.  However, while this dominance is likely to continue in the 
                                               
 12 Catharine Titi, The European Union’s Proposal for an International Investment 
Court: Significance, Innovations and Challenges Ahead, 14 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1 
(2017). 
 13 See REASSERTION OF CONTROL OVER THE INVESTMENT TREATY REGIME 119 (An-
dreas Kulick ed., 2016).  Now that the Court of Justice of the European Union has 
determined that investor-state dispute settlement and portfolio investment are sub-
ject to shared competence, those portions of the EU’s FTAs will not enter into force 
until they are approved by the individual EU Member States.  See infra Section 4.2. 
 14 Singapore Int’l Arbitration Centre [SIAC], SIAC IA Rules 2017, [hereinafter 
SIAC, SIAC IA Rules 2017] http://www.siac.org.sg/our-rules/rules/siac-ia-rules-
2017 [https://perma.cc/D5HA-HW98] (last visited Feb. 9, 2018).  For a more gen-
eral discussion of the increasing importance of commercial arbitration in various 
Asian countries, see SIMON GREENBERG, CHRISTOPHER KEE & J. ROMESH 
WEERAMANTRY, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: AN ASIA-PACIFIC 
PERSPECTIVE 36–37 (2011). 
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foreseeable future, the long-term continuation of ICSID’s domi-
nance in the market for investment arbitration is by no means guar-
anteed. 
 We develop our argument in three parts.  Section 2 outlines how 
network effects operate, and describes the related concept of institu-
tional lock-in.  Section 3—the heart of our argument—argues that 
network effects are manifest with respect to the dominance of ICSID 
in the market for investment arbitration.  To this end, three sources 
of increasing returns are examined:  the first relates to the impres-
sion of institutional legitimacy; the second relates to predictability 
and familiarity regarding the rules and procedures of an arbitral in-
stitution; and the third concerns the general quality and scope of ar-
bitral service.  The critical issue of sub-optimal institutional lock-in 
is also briefly discussed.  After constructing the core of our argu-
ment, Section 3 considers the variety of exogenous shocks that may 
disrupt institutional lock-in—what we call “disruptive events.”  
Several possibilities are considered, such as the European Union’s 
push for an investment “court,” potential competition from the PCA 
or other arbitration centers, and unforeseen legislative changes.  Sec-
tion 5 concludes the Article. 
 
2.  NETWORK EFFECTS AND INSTITUTIONAL LOCK-IN UNPACKED 
  
2.1.  Network Effects 
 
 Network externalities, or network effects, were first discussed as 
early as 1974 by Jeffrey Rohlfs, who identified the phenomenon in 
the context of telephone systems.15  The idea was taken up again in 
the mid 1980s, with Katz and Shapiro’s foundational work on the 
subject, and has since been further explored in the literature.16  The 
                                               
 15 Jeffrey Rohlfs, A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service, 
5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 16 (1974). 
 16 See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 5. 
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idea of network effects is relatively straightforward:  A network ef-
fect occurs where the implicit value of a product or service increases 
as the number of other agents using the product or service grows, 
which in turn draws more users.17  This creates a dynamic of increas-
ing returns.  The often-used example of a network effect is lan-
guage.18  Language is fundamentally predisposed to a network ef-
fect.19  The more people who, for example, speak English, the more 
useful English is to each one of its speakers.  As English grows in 
popularity, so too does its value, encouraging further growth in a 
“snowball-like” fashion.20  
 There are numerous other examples of network effects—e.g., tel-
ephone networks, railway gauges, computer software, credit cards, 
videotape standards, currencies, electrical outlets, screw thread 
sizes, or even time zones.21  The dynamic reinforces bourgeoning 
                                               
 17 See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Effects and Externalities, in 
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 671, 671 (Peter New-
man ed., 1998). 
 18 For a very good overview of other network effect examples in a wide range of 
contexts, see Joseph Ferrell & Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-In: Competition 
and Switching Costs and Network Effects, 3 HANDBOOK INDUS. ORG. 1970 (2006). 
 19 Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic 
Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 489 (1998) (“Language, for example, is the fundamental 
medium of communication and could be said to have both negligible inherent value 
to the first speaker and increasing value over the range of additional speakers.”); 
see also S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon 
Tragedy, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 136 (1994); Amitai Aviram, A Network Effects Analysis 
of Private Ordering (Berkeley Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper Se-
ries, 2003) 15.  For a more in-depth analysis of the network effects of language, see, 
e.g., Jeffery Church & Ian King, Bilingualism and Network Externalities, 26 CAN. J. 
ECON. 337 (1993). 
 20 See Bryan Druzin, Buying Commercial Law: Choice of Law, Choice of Forum, and 
Network Externalities, 18 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 131, 151 (2009) (arguing that net-
work effects induce standardization in choice of law and choice of forum clauses in 
transnational commercial contracts). 
 
 21 For a very good overview of other network effect examples in a wide range of 
contexts, see Ferrell & Klemperer, supra note 18.  For other inquiries along these 
lines, see Dominique Foray, The Dynamic Implications of Increasing Returns: Techno-
logical Change and Path Dependent Inefficiency, 15 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 733 (1997); JAMES 
SIMMIE, PATH DEPENDENCE AND NEW PATH CREATION IN RENEWABLE ENERGY 
TECHNOLOGIES 9 (2016). 
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patterns, causing the patterns to become progressively more en-
trenched over time, which ultimately gives rise to a monolithic 
standard.  Markets subject to increasing returns will initially exhibit 
multiple equilibria, but will “finally lock-in to a monopoly with one 
standard cornering the entire market.”22  Thus one technology that 
“by chance gains an early lead in adoption may eventually ‘corner 
the market’ of potential adopters, with the other technologies be-
coming locked out.”23  Network effect pressure renders a highly in-
terconnected system unable to sustain multiple equilibria for long 
periods because the force of network effects invariably pushes the 
market towards a single dominant standard—in this case, a domi-
nant standard in the market for investment arbitration services.  The 
process may create institutional lock-in. 
 
2.2.  Institutional Lock-in 
 
 First developed by North in the early 1990s, the concept of insti-
tutional lock-in applies the concept of increasing returns and path 
dependency identified in relation to certain technological standards 
of institutional arrangements.24  North believes that the path de-
                                               
 22 TIM WEITZEL, ECONOMICS OF STANDARDS IN INFORMATION NETWORKS 19 (2004).  
Such markets are also termed “hyperselective.”  RUDI BEKKERS, MOBILE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS: GSM, UMST, TETRA, AND ERMES 196 (2001). 
 23 Arthur, Competing Technologies, supra note 5. 
 24 See NORTH, supra note 7 (detailing the relationship between organizations and 
institutions and characterizing the manner in which they evolve alongside technol-
ogy within the greater economy).  While path dependence theory was first formu-
lated as an explanation of technology adoption, the theory has had a conceptual 
impact on evolutionary economics.  See, e.g., RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. 
WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 206–07 (1982) (“Firms at 
any time are viewed as possessing various capabilities, procedures, and decision 
rules that determine what they must do given external conditions.”).  Indeed, it has 
a wide scope of potential application.  As David Grewal opines: “[T]he discussion 
of network externalities has been largely restricted to problems of technical coordi-
nation and the compatibility of different technology products, which can seem to 
limit its broader relevance.  Nevertheless, the insights of this literature may have a 
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pendence concept has “equal explanatory power in helping us un-
derstand institutional change.  In both cases increasing returns are 
the key to path dependence . . . .”25  North’s translation of the path 
dependence thesis to institutions identifies several causes of increas-
ing returns with respect to institutions:  (a) the high start-up costs 
involved in setting up alternative institutions from scratch; (b) the 
significant learning effects for an organization; (c) direct and indirect 
coordination effects driven by interconnection with other organiza-
tions; and (d) the reduction in uncertainty regarding the perma-
nency of the rules of an organization.26  Taken together, these fea-
tures, North argues, will produce “massive increasing returns”27 that 
will channel the development of institutions in a path dependent di-
rection.28 
 The positive feedback produced will “cause the path of institu-
tional change to be locked in a specific pattern . . . .”29  The “increas-
ing-returns characteristics of the institutional matrix and the com-
plementary subjective models of the players suggest that although 
the specific short-run paths are unforeseeable, the overall direction 
in the long run is both more predictable and more difficult to re-
verse.”30  Thus, when institutions generate increasing returns, it be-
comes very difficult for rival institutions to successfully vie for mar-
ket dominance.31  As G. John Ikenberry explains, “[w]hen 
institutions manifest increasing returns, it becomes very difficult for 
                                               
more general application.”  DAVIS S. GREWAL, NETWORK POWER: THE SOCIAL 
DYNAMICS OF GLOBALIZATION 63 (2008). 
 25 Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 109 n.10 (1991). 
 26 See NORTH, supra note 7, at 95 (applying W. Brian Arthur’s four self-reinforcing 
mechanisms to a world in which there are increasing returns to institutions). 
 27 Id. 
 28 See GRAEME DONALD SNOOKS, THE EPHEMERAL CIVILIZATION: EXPLODING THE 
MYTH OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION 92–93 (Taylor & Francis 2003) (summarizing North’s 
application of path dependency to a world of increasing institutional returns and 
how North believes it explains both inefficient institutional systems and differential 
economic performance). 
 29 SHUANPING DAI, NETWORKS OF INSTITUTIONS: INSTITUTIONAL EMERGENCE, 
SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF POLICIES 43 (2015). 
 30 NORTH, supra note 7, at 104. 
 31 DAI, supra note 29. 
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potential replacement institutions to compete and succeed.”32  Put 
simply, institutions become, in effect, “monopolies” in the markets 
within which they operate.  
 We argue that the world of investment arbitration is experiencing 
a form of institutional lock-in.  Unlike North, however, we are not so 
much concerned with organizations becoming locked into inefficient 
rules and norms; rather, we are interested in how actors become 
locked into the organization itself, specifically, ICSID.  We identify 
three sources of increasing returns with respect to the field of invest-
ment arbitration that has produced a high degree of institutional 
lock-in.  It is to these three sources of increasing returns that we now 
turn.  
 
3.  HOW NETWORK EFFECTS REINFORCE THE MARKET DOMINANCE OF 
ICSID AND CREATE INSTITUTIONAL LOCK-IN 
 
3.1.  Direct Versus Indirect Network Effects 
 
 The network externalities that underpin and reinforce ICSID are 
a species of network effects known in the literature as indirect net-
work effects.33  Network effects may emerge with respect to a wide 
variety of goods or services beyond merely physically networked 
                                               
 32 G. JOHN IKENBERRY, AFTER VICTORY: INSTITUTIONS, STRATEGIC RESTRAINT, AND 
THE REBUILDING OF ORDER AFTER MAJOR WARS 70 (2009). 
 33 As opposed to direct network effects, which derive their force purely from the 
synchronization value they provide.  For a deeper explanation of the distinction 
between indirect and direct network effects, see Druzin, supra note 20, at 149–53; see 
also Paul Klemperer, Network Goods (Theory), THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (2d ed. 2008) (explaining the common mechanism by 
which one network tends to succeed amid competition between incompatible net-
works); Katz & Shapiro, supra note 5 (outlining three sources of positive 
consumption externalities—positive consumption externalities being the increase 
in utility that a user derives from a good due to the increase in the number of total 
users of that utility); Lemley & McGowan, supra note 19, at 488–94 (distinguishing 
between what they term “actual networks,” “virtual networks,” and “positive feed-
back effects”). 
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items, such as telecommunications, or networks that rely on direct 
interaction between users, as in the case of languages.  The literature 
distinguishes between network externalities that involve direct in-
teraction between network participants (i.e., direct network effects) 
and those that involve “mediation through the marketplace” in the 
form of decreased costs, etc. (i.e., indirect network effects).34  While 
less obvious, indirect network externalities can exert significant 
pressure on a market.  
 To illustrate the power of indirect network effects, consider taxi 
cabs in Hong Kong.  Virtually every taxi cab in Hong Kong is the 
identical car model—a Toyota Crown Comfort YXS10.35  There is, 
however, no regulatory requirement stipulating that cabbies use this 
model.  The Toyota Crown Comfort YXS10 gained ascendancy as a 
consequence of indirect network externalities stemming from its 
widespread use.  For instance, because it is widely used, the price of 
replacement parts for the Toyota Crown Comfort YXS10 is compar-
atively cheap, auto body shops able to service the vehicle are more 
numerous, and the automobile is more distinguishable as a taxi to 
potential patrons.  Now consider the position of a new taxi driver 
plugging into this powerful system of indirect network externalities 
who is theoretically “free” to select any model of car he or she 
wishes.  The driver will effectively be compelled to purchase the 
Toyota Crown Comfort YXS10, which in turn further reinforces the 
car’s market dominance.  
                                               
 34 S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Are Network Externalities a New Source of 
Market Failure?, 17 RES. L. & ECON. 3 (1995).  For a more formal overview of the 
concepts of positive feedback and self-reinforcement, see Scott E. Page, Path 
Dependence, 1 Q.J. POL. SCI. 87 (2006). 
 35 See Yoree Koh, Toyota Chief: I’ll Take the Taxi, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 10, 2011, 2:14 
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2011/03/10/toyota-chief-ill-take-the-
taxi/ [https://perma.cc/BHN2-X9S5?safari=1] (noting success of the Toyota 
Crown Comfort YXS10 in the taxi market in Japan and Hong Kong); COLIN 
BAMFORD & SUSAN GRANT, CAMBRIDGE INTERNATIONAL AS AND A LEVEL ECONOMICS 
COURSEBOOK 163 (3d ed. 2014), https://www.gceguide.xyz/files/e-books/a-
level/Cambridge%20Interna-
tional%20AS%20and%20A%20Level%20Economics.pdf [https://perma.cc/SB48-
QSN9] (stating the fact that Hong Kong has 15,000, mostly privately owned Toyota 
taxis). 
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 This network effect is indirect—the effect is “mediated through 
the marketplace.”  Indeed, the advent of the automobile itself is a 
good example of indirect network effects in action.  Initially, the lack 
of suitable roads during the early days of the automobile was an is-
sue.  However, as more people purchased cars, more surfaced roads 
were built to better accommodate motorized vehicles.  With more 
surfaced roads, the utility of owning a motor vehicle increased, at-
tracting more consumers.  And on it went in a self-reinforcing pro-
cess.36  
 We argue that indirect network effects are manifest with respect 
to the dominance of ICSID in the market for investment arbitration.  
Indirect network effects emerge in three primary ways.  To some ex-
tent, these mirror North’s argument summarized above, which is 
based on indirect network effects; however, the sources of increas-
ing returns we cite below are specific to the character of investment 
arbitration.  Together, these three indirect network effects produce 
increasing returns that push forcefully towards institutional lock-in. 
 
3.2.  Impression of Legitimacy 
 
 The first relates to a general impression of institutional legiti-
macy.  An arbitration center’s reputation will increase commensu-
rate with growth in its user base.  An institution that is a recognized 
authority will attract more “users” thereby increasing its user base 
in a self-reinforcing fashion.37  This appears to be the case with 
                                               
 36 Katz and Shapiro argue that positive consumption externalities include indi-
rect support networks.  Katz and Shapiro use an example drawn from the American 
automobile market in the twentieth century where “foreign manufacturers’ sales 
initially were retarded by consumers’ awareness of the less experienced and thinner 
service networks that existed for new or less popular brands.”  Katz & Shapiro, 
supra note 5. 
 37 It should be noted, however, that this is not a perfect market, in that, actors’ 
choices are somewhat constrained by the prescription of specific arbitral 
institutions under investment treaties.  Yet, these selections should also be affected, 
albeit in a less obvious fashion, by network effects. 
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ICSID, which has experienced escalating growth over the last two 
decades.38 
 
Figure 1.  The figure shows the total number of ICSID cases  
registered by calendar year. 
 
 
 
 
 These numbers could of course simply reflect growth in the num-
ber of investment arbitration cases more generally, and it is true that 
                                               
 38 INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES [ICSID], THE ICSID CASELOAD–
STATISTICS 7 chart 1 (2017) [hereinafter ICSID, CASELOAD STATISTICS], https://ic-
sid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-
1%20(English)%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5TD-35RG].  For a general discus-
sion of legitimacy challenges relating to investment arbitration and their implica-
tions for ICSID, see Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Legitimacy of the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes, in LEGITIMACY AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS 234 
(Nienke Grossman et al. eds., forthcoming 2018). 
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in the past several years the filing of non-ICSID Convention cases39 
has also increased.  The Pluricourts Centre of Excellence at the Uni-
versity of Oslo has data showing that approximately 41 percent of 
the 878 known investment cases have not been ICSID Convention 
cases.40  The ratio of ICSID to non-ICSID cases varies from year to 
year.  UNCTAD’s 2015 Issues Note shows ICSID and non-ICSID 
cases as having been instituted in approximately equal numbers for 
some years, but with ICSID cases eclipsing those of its (collective) 
rivals in others.41  Overall, however, it is clear that ICSID’s market 
share seems to be holding steady or increasing as the total number 
of cases has increased.  Thus, we believe its market-dominant posi-
tion—with 59 percent of known treaty cases submitted under ICSID 
Convention, and even more administered by the Centre under other 
arbitration rules—is well established. 
 The fact that ICSID is widely recognized and extensively used 
provides a certain reassurance to claimants.  As of December 2017, 
ICSID boasted 161 signatory States and 153 States Party to ICSID 
Convention.42  Because contracting member states agree to enforce 
and uphold ICSID arbitral awards as if they are final judgments of 
their own courts, actors are confident that ICSID awards will be hon-
ored and enforced.  This impression of legitimacy only strengthens 
as its customer base increases—a classic self-reinforcing process.  
                                               
 39 For purposes of this Article the term “ICSID cases” refers to cases submitted 
under the ICSID Convention and its accompanying arbitration rules but does not 
encompass other cases administered by ICSID but submitted under other arbitral 
rules, such as the ICSID additional facility rules or the U.N. Commission on Inter-
national Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) rules. 
 40 Daniel Behn, The Performance of Investment Treaty Arbitration, in THE 
PERFORMANCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (Theresa Squatrito et al. eds., 
2017). 
 41 U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], Recent Trends in IIAs and ISDS 
No. 1, at 5 fig. 2 (Feb. 2015), http://unctad.org/en/Publications Library/webdi-
aepcb2015d1_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQL3-BS6C].  
 42 Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes [ICSID], Database of ICSID Member States, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/XQL3-BS6C] (last visited Mar. 4, 2018). 
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 Impressions of legitimacy may be connected to North’s argument 
that “adaptive expectations aris[e] from the prevalence of contract-
ing based on the existing institutions.”43  That is, the increasing cer-
tainty regarding the permanency of the rules of an institution creates 
a situation of increasing returns related to that institution. 
 
3.3.  Predictability and Familiarity with the Rules 
 
 The second source of increasing returns we identify relates to pre-
dictability and familiarity regarding the rules and procedures of the 
institution.  With widespread use, users gain a greater familiarity 
with the rules and procedures of that particular institution.  Indeed, 
ICSID Convention arbitration is an option—sometimes the only op-
tion—in numerous investment treaties.  This creates a positive feed-
back loop:  The more frequently the services of ICSID are utilized, 
the more familiar these services become to potential users, encour-
aging more users to opt for ICSID.  This is equally true for the law-
yers who represent these claimants.  The more claimants go to 
ICSID, the more lawyers advise clients to go to ICSID.  The greater 
the number of cases decided by ICSID Convention tribunals, the 
more ICSID Convention arbitration is likely to be studied by counsel 
and recommended as the best option.  This dynamic mirrors North’s 
observation that learning effects connected to the institution—
namely, users’ growing understanding of the institution’s rules and 
complexity of use—is an additional source of increasing returns.44 
 
3.4.  Quality and Scope of Arbitral Service 
 
 The third source of increasing returns relates to the general qual-
ity and scope of arbitral service.  Breadth and expertise of arbitral 
services are powerful considerations for claimants.  Institutions vary 
in terms of their reputation for competence in dealing with a wide 
                                               
 43 North, Institutions, supra note 25, at 109. 
 44 See NORTH, supra note 7, at 95. 
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array of legal matters.  This reputation also builds on itself.  If the 
institution is perceived as possessing a high degree of competence 
in specialized areas of dispute, the institution will attract more 
claimants in these areas.45  To date, ICSID has administered over 550 
cases, some 73.6 percent of which were based on investment trea-
ties,46 distributed across an impressively wide swath of economic 
sectors. 
 
 Figure 2.  The chart below shows the distribution of all ICSID  
 registered cases by economic sector as of December 31, 2015.47 
 
 
 These indirect network effects generate self-reinforcing pressure 
for claimants to take their matters to ICSID, bolstering the market 
dominance of the arbitration center.  The presence of indirect net-
work effects in the market for arbitration services is significant be-
cause network effect pressures will have the peculiar effect of “lock-
ing in” a standard, rendering it tenaciously resistant to competition.  
The result is that institutional lock-in occurs.  Ikenberry defines the 
process thusly:  “[M]ore people and more of their activities are 
hooked into the institution and its operations.  A wider array of in-
dividuals and groups, in more countries and more realms of activi-
ties, have a stake—or a vested interest—in the continuation of the 
                                               
 45 While, typically, the disputants jointly agree to the arbitrator, ICSID does have 
a roster of arbitrators from which the Secretary-General has to appoint absent party 
agreement. 
 46 ICSID, CASELOAD STATISTICS, supra note 38, at 7 chart 1, 10 chart 5. 
 47 Id. at 12 chart 12. 
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institution.”48  The result is that the “costs of disruption or change in 
the institutions grow over time.  This means that ‘competing orders’ 
or ‘alternative institutions’ are at a disadvantage.  The system is in-
creasingly hard to replace.”49  Any serious assessment of the likeli-
hood of institutional competition from other regions of the globe in 
the field of investment arbitration needs to consider the implications 
of this dynamic. 
 
3.5.  Critical Mass and Penguins 
 
 If there are no bounds to increasing returns, a networked market 
will eventually induce a lock-in situation—“a point is reached after 
which every agent, regardless of inherent preferences, will select the 
same technology.”50  Once a monopoly emerges, it becomes locked 
in as “no actor is willing to bear the disproportionate risk of being 
the first adopter of a standard and then becoming stranded in a 
small network . . . .”51  This inability to challenge a locked-in stand-
ard is known as the start-up problem.52  As one scholar observes, any 
system that “share[s] the characteristics of lock-in—the presence of 
network externalities, the absence of entrepreneurs who can induce 
transition, and the absence of a centralized authority that can man-
date simultaneous change—could be as vulnerable to path depend-
ence as technological standards.”53  Under such conditions, it is ex-
tremely difficult for a new standard to start up and dislodge a 
standard that is already locked in as a result of powerful network 
effects. 
                                               
 48 IKENBERRY, supra note 32. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Paul A. David & Shane Greenstein, The Economics of Compatibility Standards: 
An Introduction to Recent Research, 1 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 3, 6 (1990), 
https://www.dl.icdst.org/pdfs/files/03ecaab6441c4ce75bdb187b0e539384.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X7MT-EP4A]. 
 51 WEITZEL, supra note 22, at 16. 
 52 North identifies this dynamic as the problem of large initial set-up costs.  See 
NORTH, supra note 7, at 95. 
 53 Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813, 820 
(1998). 
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 It becomes a problem of critical mass.  What is termed hysteresis 
effect plays a crucial role here.54  The hysteresis effect states that “the 
product is only interesting for potential customers if a critical mass 
of consumers is reached such that the sum of original and derivative 
utility outweighs the respective costs” of adopting a new standard.55  
A certain chicken and egg paradox emerges:  “many consumers are 
not interested in purchasing the good because the installed base is 
too small, and the installed base is too small because an insuffi-
ciently small number of consumers have purchased the good.”56  
This makes it very difficult to achieve sufficient critical mass.  If only 
a fraction of the market adopts a new technology, for many users the 
gains will be below costs.57  The market will therefore become locked 
in with no one willing to bear the costs of switching to a new stand-
ard.58  This has been termed the “penguin effect”:  “Penguins who 
must enter the water to find food often delay doing so because they 
                                               
 54 A. KEMPER, VALUATION OF NETWORK EFFECTS IN SOFTWARE MARKETS: A 
COMPLEX NETWORKS APPROACH 73 (2010). 
 55 Id. at 73–74.  For this principle, see Nicholas Economides & Charles Himmel-
berg, Critical Mass and Network Evolution in Telecommunications, in TOWARD A 
COMPETITIVE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY: SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE 1994 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH CONFERENCE 47 (Gerald W. Brock ed., 
1995); Michel Clement et al., Netzeffekte und Kritische Masse [Network Effects and Crit-
ical Mass], in MARKETING MIT INTERAKTIVEN MEDIEN: STATEGIEN ZUM MARKTERFOLG 
[MARKETING WITH INTERACTIVE MEDIA: STRATEGIES FOR MARKETING SUCCESS] (Sönke 
Albers et al. eds., 1998); Soon-Yong Choi & Andrew B. Whinston, The Future of the 
Digital Economy, in HANDBOOK ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 25 (Michael Shaw et al. 
eds., 2000). 
 56 Nicholas Economides & Charles Himmelberg, Critical Mass and Network Size 
with Application to the U.S. FAX Market 47, 51 (N.Y.U. Stern Sch. of Bus., Working 
Paper No. EC-95-11, 1995), http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/95-11.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E7KG-4BM3]. 
 57 David & Greenstein, supra note 50, at 9. 
 58 Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, 
Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 940, 940 (1986). 
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fear the presence of predators.  Each would prefer some other pen-
guin to test the waters first.”59  This dynamic greatly inhibits com-
petition in the market, keeping a user base locked into a standard.60  
 The danger, of course, is the standard that locks in is sub-opti-
mal.61  Indeed, the literature on standards suggests that network-ef-
fect markets “may exhibit ‘excess inertia’ and remain locked into a 
standard, even though an objectively ‘better’ standard is availa-
ble.”62  The result of this may be a situation in which an institution 
grows profoundly Pareto-inferior due to shifting exogenous condi-
tions, yet its market dominance cannot be successfully challenged 
by more efficient institutional arrangements.63  In this way, institu-
tional development—both within and between institutions—may 
grind to a pernicious halt, becoming stunted and inefficient. 
 
                                               
 59 Id. at 493 n.9. 
 60 For a discussion of the potential hazards of lock-in in relation to law, see Gil-
lette, supra note 53, at 813 (positing that lock-in can result in institutional inefficien-
cies where an institution may become excessively routinized, choice limiting, and 
slow to adapt); Clayton P. Gillette, Harmony and Stasis in Trade Usage for International 
Sales, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 707, 711–12 (1999) (discussing lock-in in relation to trade 
usages standards); see also Bryan H. Druzin, Why does Soft Law have any Power 
Anyway?, ASIAN J.  INT’L L. 1, 1–18 (2016) (discussing the possibility of sub-optimal 
lock-in with respect to soft law); id. at 14–16 (noting that locked-in soft law 
instruments may, in principle, be dislodged by more innovative or more efficient 
rules).  See generally Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of 
Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 759 (1995) (increasing returns in corporate contract 
terms, arguing that network externalities can induce standardization in firm con-
tracts); Lemley & McGowan, supra note 19, at 481 (suggesting ways “particular legal 
rules should—and should not—be modified to take account of network effects”).  
In the political science literature, the idea of network lock-in has been applied more 
generally to the process of globalization. See GREWAL, supra note 24; see also Beth A. 
Simmons & Zachary Elkins, The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the 
International Economy, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 171 (2004), https://dash.har-
vard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3157884/Simmons_GlobalizationLiberaliza-
tion.pdf?sequence=2 [https://perma.cc/9CN8-ZCD7]. 
 61 Klausner, supra note 60, at 765.  But see Lemley & McGowan, supra note 19, at 
494 (arguing against the assumption that network effects produce suboptimal lock-
in).   
 62 Page, supra note 6, at 961. 
 63 KEMPER, supra note 54, at 76–77 (discussing Pareto-inferior market results from 
network lock-in). 
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4.  THE POSSIBILITY OF “DISRUPTIVE EVENTS” AND “INSTITUTIONAL 
BREAK-OUT” 
 
4.1.  Institutional Break-out 
 
 The effects of lock-in, however, may not be quite as robust as the 
model projects.  Indeed, the inevitability of a lock-in effect is the sub-
ject of some debate in the literature.  Liebowitz and Margolis ques-
tion the notion that network effects induce a permanent monopoly, 
arguing that although there are indeed periods of persistent lock-in 
where one product dominates the market—they look at the software 
market—network effect markets will frequently tip towards a new 
monopoly64 in a process which they termed “serial monopoly.”65 
 A variety of considerations can disrupt a lock-in effect.  Liebowitz 
and Margolis, for example, argue that major product innovations 
and predatory pricing can successfully challenge a locked-in mo-
nopoly.66  Building on this insight, others have noted that network 
effects do not inevitably result in natural monopolies, and that 
“[d]ifferences in the quality of competing network goods, or in their 
production costs may offset the relative advantage of the larger net-
work.”67  Thus, the presence of network effects does “not necessarily 
                                               
 64 But see STAN J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS, AND 
MICROSOFT: COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY 227–29 (2001) (stat-
ing that their data provides no support for the concept of tipping even though it is 
reasonable in principle). 
 65 Id. at 10; see S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J. L. 
& ECON. 1, 2–3 (1990) (refuting the much-cited QWERTY keyboard example of lock-
in, claiming that evidence of the superiority of Dvorak, a keyboard competitor to 
the QWERTY layout, is lacking); see also William E. Cohen, Competition and Foreclo-
sure in the Context of Installed Base and Compatibility Effects, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 535, 
539–46 (1996); Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 5. 
 66 LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS, AND MICROSOFT, supra note 64, at 
110. 
 67 Aviram, supra note 19, at 15; see also Liebowitz & Margolis, Network Effects and 
Externalities, supra note 17, at 672 (noting that in instances where production costs 
lead to significant decreasing returns, competing incompatible markets can 
emerge). 
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result in a winner-takes-all situation:  they can partly or fully be un-
done by other factors . . . .”68  Katz and Shapiro contend that if “rival 
systems have distinct features sought by certain consumers, two or 
more systems may be able to survive by catering to consumers who 
care more about product attributes than network size.”69  In such 
cases, multiple equilibria can be sustained and competition may 
emerge.  
 However, users in a situation of institutional lock-in face a mas-
sive coordination problem: Absent a regulator that can facilitate (or 
even mandate) a simultaneous jump to a new network by all the 
members, it is very difficult for users to break away from the pre-
vailing institutional standard.  Under such conditions, some inher-
ent feature provided by an upstart competitor or a significant trans-
formation in exogenous conditions is required.  We argue that 
various disruptive events may produce what is termed institutional 
break-out.70 
 
4.2.  Potential Disruptive Actions by the European Union 
 
 Is institutional break-out on the horizon for investment arbitra-
tion?  That is the question we must ask and seek to answer.  Various 
possibilities could constitute a disruptive event that might knock us-
ers into a new equilibrium.  To be sure, investment arbitration is in 
a period of turmoil.  The European Union’s proposal for the estab-
lishment of an investment “court” that includes an appellate body is 
                                               
 68 BEKKERS, supra note 22. 
 69 Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 93, 106 (1994). 
 70 The term “institutional break-out” has been applied in a variety of ways but 
generally connotes the meaning implied here (i.e., undercutting the hold institu-
tional lock-in has on the market).  See, e.g., SABINA STILLER, IDEATIONAL LEADERSHIP 
IN GERMAN WELFARE STATE REFORM: HOW POLITICIANS AND POLICY IDEAS TRANSFORM 
RESILIENT INSTITUTION 34–36 (2010); Edwin Woerdman, Tradable Emission Rights, in 
THE ELGAR COMPANION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 364, 368–71 (Jürgen G. Backhaus 
ed., 2d ed. 2005); Oscar Couwenberg & Edwin Woerdman, Shifts in Gas Market Gov-
ernance: Path-Dependent Institutional Innovation in the Netherlands, in INNOVATION: 
TECHNICAL, ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS 25, 37–38 (Aloys Prinz et al. eds., 
2006); EDWIN WOERDMAN, IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO MECHANISMS: POLITICAL 
BARRIERS AND PATH DEPENDENCE 90–101 (2002). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/3
  
2018] Institutional Lock-in Within Investment Arbitration 731 
 
the most visible example of how investor-state dispute settlement 
might change over the coming years.  Whether this proposal is truly 
a sea change that will result in a challenge to ICSID’s market domi-
nance is unclear.  A great deal depends on how broadly the Euro-
pean Union succeeds in implementing its two-tiered investment 
court and whether, as currently seems likely, ICSID is chosen to be 
the only or one of the institutions that hosts the court, even if those 
proceedings do not take place under the auspices of ICSID Conven-
tion.  Other exogenous factors might come into play as well; other 
market actors already vie with ICSID to host investment arbitra-
tions, a trend that one can only expect to continue.  
 The European Union has concluded two free trade agreements 
whose investment chapters include proposals for a two-tiered in-
vestment court, though neither has yet entered into force.71  Moreo-
ver, the investment court aspect of CETA is one piece of the agree-
ment that will not be provisionally applied due to the reservations 
of Wallonia, and perhaps other European provinces and countries 
as well.72  The European Union has proposed that a similar institu-
tion be included in the T-TIP that it had been negotiating with the 
United States.73  The election of President Trump puts those negoti-
ations in doubt.  The EU-Singapore FTA, negotiations for which 
                                               
 71 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) art. 8.18, Sept. 21, 
2017, [hereinafter CETA] http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/septem-
ber/tradoc_152806.pdf [https://perma.cc/T84Q-3M36]; Free Trade Agreement Be-
tween the European Union and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, opened for signa-
ture Jan. 2016, [hereinafter EU-Vietnam FTA] 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3563 
[https://perma.cc/7ADZ-ZF9B] (Section 3: “Resolution of Investment Disputes” 
and Section 3, Sub-Section 4: “Investment Tribunal System”). 
 72 Council Decision 10974/16 of Oct. 5, 2016, on the Provisional Application of 
the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) Between Canada, of 
the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part, 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10974-2016-INIT/en/pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YQ3D-5KH8] (last visited Mar. 4, 2018) (excluding most of 
Chapter 8 from provisional application).  
 73 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: European Union’s Proposal 
for Investment Protection and Resolution of Investment Disputes art. 3.4, Nov. 12, 
2015, [hereinafter T-TIP Proposal] http://trade.ec.europa.eu/do-
clib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4FH-N8BX]. 
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were concluded on October 17, 2014, does not yet contain the court,74 
but one expects that the European Union might re-open negotiations 
to include a similar mechanism,75 or possibly that a parallel agree-
ment addressing investment and any other matters of shared com-
petence will be negotiated in order that the EU-Singapore FTA can 
be finalized by the European Union alone.76 
  The European Union sees the establishment of these courts as nu-
clei, which would presumably be merged, for a multilateral invest-
                                               
 74 See EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement art. 9.1, Oct. 17, 2014, [hereinafter 
EU-Singapore FTA] http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961 
[https://perma.cc/X26X-TFC2]. 
 75  See Michael P. Daly & Jawad Ahmad, The EU-Vietnam FTA: What Does it All 
Mean? What Does it Mean for the Future?, WOLTERS KLUWER: ARB. BLOG (Dec. 14, 2015) 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2015/12/14/the-eu-vietnam-fta-
what-does-it-all-mean-what-does-it-mean-for-the-future/ 
[https://perma.cc/6F6N-5BJU] (“The EU may seek to propose an Asia-wide per-
manent investment court to resolve disputes arising under the FTAs that the EU is 
currently negotiating with some Asian States (Malaysia, Thailand, India, Philip-
pines and Japan).  While the EU-Singapore FTA, which is pending signature and 
ratification, does not provide for the creation of a distinct permanent investment 
court, it does establish a joint committee (known as the ‘Trade Committee’) com-
prised of the Parties’ Trade representatives with the task to, inter alia, oversee the 
implementation of the FTA, consider amendments to the FTA and issue binding 
decisions. With these wide powers, the creation of an Asia-wide permanent invest-
ment court is not entirely farfetched. The Trade Committee is tasked, after all, to 
examine whether an appellate mechanism could be created (Article 9.30(1)(c) of the 
EU-Singapore FTA).”); see also Simon Lester, From ISDS to ICS, WORLD TRADE L.: 
INT’L ECON. L. & POL. BLOG (Dec. 2, 2015, 12:30 PM) http://world-
tradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2015/12/from-isds-to-ics.html 
[https://perma.cc/33YT-862V] (“[T]here’s the question of the yet to be ratified pre-
ICS [the “Investment Court System”] FTAs that still have old ISDS rules in them, 
such as . . . the EU-Singapore FTA.  Can those really be ratified as currently written, 
when the new and improved version of ISDS is out there, being sold as a better 
alternative?”). 
 76 Avis 2/15, Opinion 2/15 of the Court (Full Court), ECLI:EU:C:2017:376 (May 
16, 2017), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf;jses-
sionid=9ea7d2dc30dce538338459ff41c3868deb27de5740b9.e34Kax-
iLc3qMb40Rch0SaxyNaxf0?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0&part=1&mode=D
OC&docid=190727&occ=first&dir=&cid=555503 [https://perma.cc/VQ5R-79JY]. 
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ment court to which investor-state dispute settlement in all EU in-
vestment agreements, at the least, would be brought.77  One way to 
achieve a multilateral court is gradually, by accretion, such that once 
the European Union has replaced or has caused its member states to 
re-negotiate all extra-EU BITs, they would lead to that multilateral 
court.78  A different option, which is being pursued simultaneously, 
is to establish a multilateral investment court open to all parties. 
 The potential for reform of investor-state dispute settlement, in-
cluding the possible establishment of a multilateral investment 
court, is currently the subject of study by United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law’s (“UNCITRAL”) Working Group 
III.79  The establishment of a multilateral investment court is by no 
means a foregone conclusion; the first meeting convened to discuss 
the project, in late November 2017, was marked by an unusual de-
gree of dissension.  UNCITRAL ordinarily operates by consensus, 
but this meeting featured the group’s second vote ever—after the 
1979 decision to move UNCITRAL’s headquarters from New York 
to Vienna—on the election of a Chair.80 
 The Working Group’s mandate encompasses more than the con-
sideration of whether the international community should establish 
an international investment court, though that is clearly one of the 
main proposals it will address.  The establishment of such a court 
                                               
 77 Stephen W. Schill, Editorial: U.S. Versus EU Leadership in Global Investment Gov-
ernance, 17 J. WORLD INVEST. & TRADE 1, 2 (2016) (“The Commission’s proposal to 
create a permanent investment court is a strong vision and the text presented con-
stitutes the first concrete step towards practical implementation. . . . The proposal 
breathes the right spirit: to transform investor-state arbitration into a truly public, 
fully transparent, more predictable and balanced system of global adjudication.”). 
 78 CETA, supra note 71, art. 8.29; European Commission Press Release 
IP/15/5651, Commission Proposes New Investment Court System for TTIP and Other 
EU Trade and Investment Negotiations (Sept. 16, 2015), http://eu-
ropa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5651_en.htm [https://perma.cc/5Z7E-W65P]. 
 79 U.N. Secretariat, U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Possible Reform of Inves-
tor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.142 (Sept. 18, 
2017). 
 80 For a description of some of the discussions, see Anthea Roberts, UNCITRAL 
and ISDS Reform: Not Business as Usual, EJIL: TALK! (Dec. 11, 2017), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reform-not-business-as-usual/ 
[https://perma.cc/NFQ8-HBPQ]. 
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would be a far from simple task.  Two unofficial background papers 
prepared by the Geneva Center for International Dispute Settlement 
cover in some detail the hurdles facing the establishment of an in-
ternational investment court and mechanisms to enable it at least 
partially to work within the existing investor-state dispute settle-
ment framework.81  While some countries, notably the European 
Union and Canada, favor the creation of a multilateral court, others, 
such as the United States and Japan, either appear to be opposed or 
have yet to come out on one side or the other.82 
 Whether any court under any agreement will ever be established 
is thus an open question.  The European Council’s decision to ex-
clude the investment court from provisional application, followed 
by the decision of the CJEU that the EU-Singapore FTA (and by anal-
ogy other European FTAs), means that there will be no CETA in-
vestment court until twenty-eight or, more likely, twenty-seven83 
member states have ratified the Agreement.  The portions of the 
treaty subject to EU competence have provisional effect as of Sep-
tember 21, 2017, after the European Parliament voted to approve it.84  
                                               
 81 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Michele Potestà, Can the Mauritius Convention 
Serve as a Model for the Reform of Investor-State Arbitration in Connection with the Intro-
duction of a Permanent Investment Tribunal or an Appeal Mechanism? (June 3, 2017), 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/CIDS_Research_Paper_Mauritius.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/69QE-C8D4]; Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Michele Potestà, 
The Composition of a Multilateral Investment Court and of an Appeal Mechanism for In-
vestment Awards (Nov. 15, 2017), http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commis-
sion/  working_groups/3Investor_State.html [https://perma.cc/LXK2-CX4Y]. 
 82 For a description of some of the debate, see Roberts, supra note 80. 
 83 The reference to twenty-seven, rather than twenty-eight, is based on the as-
sumption that the United Kingdom will indeed leave the EU and, therefore, only 
twenty-seven member states will be left to ratify the CETA.  In some member States, 
regional parliaments might have to ratify as well.  See, e.g., European Council Press 
Release 623/16, EU-Canada Trade Agreement: Council Adopts Decision to Sign 
CETA (Oct. 28, 2016), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-re-
leases/2016/10/28-eu-canada-trade-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/SH64-4CYT]. 
 84 CETA:  MEPs Back EU-Canada Trade Agreement, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: NEWS 
(Feb. 15, 2017), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/20170209IPR61728/ceta-meps-back-eu-canada-trade-agreement 
[https://perma.cc/ZYF6-E8DR]; see also Hans Von Der Burchard & Alberto Mucci, 
POLITICO Pro’s Morning Trade: TTIP Bogged Down in Feta Cheese – CETA Will be a 
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 At least for now one can assume that CETA will be put to national 
and regional Parliaments.  (An alternative would appear to be re-
negotiation of the agreement to exclude those portions of it that are 
subject to mixed competence, and then to have the revised agree-
ment approved by the relevant European Union institutions.)  Given 
the hostility in many member states to investor-state dispute settle-
ment, it is unclear just how difficult ratification will be.  Belgium 
only agreed to sign the agreement at the European Council after 
Canada and the European Union negotiated an interpretive state-
ment that, inter alia, confirmed the parties’ joint intention to work 
towards the creation of a multilateral investment court.85 
 Notwithstanding the interpretive statement’s pledge to establish 
a multilateral court, it is far from clear that even the insertion of the 
investment court system will be enough to satisfy the critics; Ger-
man judges have placed on the record their negative reaction to the 
T-TIP proposal.86  While there might be a fillip of anti-American sen-
timent motivating that reaction, investor-state dispute settlement in 
any context would seem to raise the same concerns.  The hostility in 
                                               
‘Mixed Agreement’, POLITICO (May 12, 2016), https://www.politico.eu/arti-
cle/politico-pros-morning-trade-ttip-bogged-down-in-feta-cheese-and-ceta-will-
be-a-mixed-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/4K5Z-THVP].  This decision follows 
the Commission’s referral to the Court of Justice of the European Union as to 
whether the EU–Singapore Agreement is a mixed agreement.  See European Com-
mission, Singapore: The Commission to Request a Court of Justice Opinion on the Trade 
Deal, EUROPEAN COMM’N: NEWS ARCHIVE (Oct. 30, 2014) http://trade.ec.eu-
ropa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1185 [https://perma.cc/4WLF-BNU8]. 
 85 Joint Interpretative Instrument on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agree-
ment (CETA) Between Canada and the European Union and its Member States, Doc. No. 
13541/16 (Oct. 27, 2016), http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-
13541-2016-INIT/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/FLP5-TYN4]. 
 86 Opinion No. 04/16 on the Establishment of an Investment Tribunal in TTIP – The 
Proposal from the European Commission on 16.09.2015 and 11.12.2015, (Feb. 2016), 
http://canadians.org/sites/default/files/tpp-deutsche-richterbund-opinion-
0216.pdf [https://perma.cc/S792-RAZ6]; see also Germany’s Judges and Public Prose-
cutors Reject Proposed Investment Court System in TTIP, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS 
(Feb. 29, 2016) https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/02/29/germanys-judges-and-
public-prosecutors-reject-proposed-investment-court-system-in-ttip/ 
[https://perma.cc/5ZFW-TLPB]. 
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Europe towards FTAs generally and investor-state dispute settle-
ment in particular is unprecedented.87  Less widespread, but still 
marked, opposition can be found in other countries as well.  Cer-
tainly, President Trump has made no secret of his hostility to multi-
lateral agreements.88  But he is not alone—the opposition to FTAs 
spanned the political spectrum during the recent U.S. Presidential 
elections.  As late as April 2016, every remaining U.S. presidential 
candidate had spoken against the Trans-Pacific Partnership.89 
                                               
 87 The European Commission received approximately 150,000 comments when 
it called for public comment on the proposed inclusion of investor-state dispute 
settlement in the T-TIP.  While a vast majority of those were ‘form’ comments gen-
erated by opponents of investor-state arbitration, some 3,500 were individualized. 
Commission Staff Working Document Report: Online Public Consultation on Investment 
Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP), at 3 (Jan. 13, 2015), http://trade.ec.eu-
ropa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153044.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4WLF-BNU8].  It is noteworthy, in addition, that the Nether-
lands recently demanded a referendum on the T-TIP. See Dutch Set to Deliver Second 
EU Bombshell Referendum over TTIP Deal, SPUTNIK INT’L (Apr. 15, 2016), http://sput-
niknews.com/europe/20160415/1038074644/ttip-deal-dutch-referendum.html 
[https://perma.cc/CWU6-SCKB]; James Crisp, Dutch Voters now Demanding Refer-
endum on TTIP, EURACTIV (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.euractiv.com/sec-
tion/trade-society/news/dutch-voters-now-demanding-referendum-on-ttip/ 
[https://perma.cc/CWU6-SCKB]. 
 88 John Cassidy, Donald Trump’s New World Disorder, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 24, 
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/donald-trumps-new-
world-disorder [https://perma.cc/SU48-MEK9] (“Rather than relying on multilat-
eral trade agreements, Trump has said that he will negotiate one-on-one deals with 
individual countries, beginning, possibly, with the post-Brexit United Kingdom.”). 
 89 For instance, Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton said about the 
TPP: “I want to make sure that I can look into the eyes of any middle-class American 
and say, ‘this will help raise your wages.’  And I concluded I could not.’”  David 
Singh Grewal, Why Hillary Clinton is Right on the TPP, THE HUFFINGTON POST: THE 
BLOG (Oct. 14, 2015) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-singh-grewal/why-
hillary-clinton-is-ri_b_8295420.html [https://perma.cc/SU48-MEK].  Bernie Sand-
ers was also strongly opposed to the trade deal and stated: “[t]he Trans-Pacific Part-
nership is a disastrous trade agreement designed to protect the interests of the larg-
est multi-national corporations at the expense of workers, consumers, the 
environment and the foundations of American democracy.  It will also negatively 
impact some of the poorest people in the world.”  Bernie Sanders, The Trans-Pacific 
Trade (TPP) Agreement Must be Defeated, (Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.sanders.sen-
ate.gov/download/the-trans-pacific-trade-tpp-agreement-must-be-defeated?in-
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 Moreover, these hurdles specific to pending FTAs do not take 
into account the other significant problems facing the world com-
munity, including the European Union.  In June 2016, the United 
Kingdom by referendum voted to leave the European Union, right-
wing nativist political parties in key European states have seen a 
surge in popular support, the refugee crisis remains staggering, and 
the fiscal affairs of Greece and certain other member states are per-
sistently bad, with corresponding threats to the Eurozone, if not to 
the European Union itself.  
 Assuming an investment court is established, one significant 
question is who will host it?  If there is more than one, who will host 
them?  ICSID is certainly a possibility.  It is the institution chosen in 
the CETA90 and is one of two institutions proposed—the other is the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration—in the T-TIP and the EU-Vietnam 
FTA.91  The proposal for a court with an appeals chamber is not fully 
compatible with ICSID Convention arbitration.  The ICSID Conven-
tion stipulates that the only recourse against an ICSID Convention 
arbitral award is annulment under the ICSID Convention itself92 and 
that only states, which would not include the European Union as 
such, can be adherents.93  There is some discussion about whether 
                                               
line=file [https://perma.cc/MN37-J42L].  Republican presidential candidates Don-
ald Trump and Ted Cruz were also generally opposed to the trade deal.  See Jon 
Greenberg, Ted Cruz: ‘I always opposed the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership)’, POLITIFACT 
(Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/state-
ments/2016/mar/10/ted-cruz/ted-cruz-i-always-opposed-tpp-trans-pacific-
partne/ [https://perma.cc/57GA-5N87]; Clayton Youngman, Trump Says China 
Gets an Advantage From the Trans-Pacific Partnership, POLITIFACT (Nov. 12, 2015), 
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2015/nov/12/donald-
trump/trump-says-china-will-take-advantage-trans-pacific/ 
[https://perma.cc/T3W7-4AZ9]; see also Alex Swoyer, John Kasich: TPP Trade Deal 
‘Critical’, BREITBART (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/big-govern-
ment/2015/11/10/john-kasich-tpp-trade-deal-critical/ [https://perma.cc/5GZ6-
TUNJ] (stating Kasich seemed to be the only presidential candidate in favor of the 
TPP). 
 90 CETA, supra note 71, art 8.27(16). 
 91 T-TIP Proposal, supra note 73, art. 9.16 (Tribunal of First Instance); EU-
Vietnam FTA, supra note 71, sec. 3, subsec. 4, art. 12.18 (Tribunal).  
 92 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, supra note 1, art. 52. 
 93 Id. art. 67. 
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the ICSID Convention can be amended inter partes although, even if 
it can be, the awards would have only limited enforceability.94 
 This impediment does not mean that ICSID cannot administer the 
court’s proceedings—it certainly can, and its qualifications and mar-
ket position make it eminently qualified to do so.  This is the case 
whether the arbitration unfolds under ICSID Additional Facility 
rules—available if either the home state of the investor or the host 
state of the investment is party to the investment treaty—or under 
ad hoc arbitration rules, such as the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.95  
That arbitration would not, however, be ICSID Convention arbitra-
tion, with its concomitant benefits—the most important of which is 
the requirement that each ICSID Convention state treat ICSID Con-
vention awards as if they were final judgments of courts of that 
state.96 
 CETA awards would be enforceable under the New York Con-
vention, but investors could nonetheless face practical hurdles to en-
forcement.  One problem an investor has to overcome, if a state re-
fuses to pay, is the hurdle of “execution immunity”:  State assets 
(and in this context “state” would include the European Union) are 
                                               
 94 See August Reinisch, Will the EU’s Proposal Concerning an Investment Court 
System for CETA and TTIP Lead to Enforceable Awards?—The Limits of Modifying the 
ICSID Convention and the Nature of Investment Arbitration, 19 J. INT’L ECON. L. 761, 
782–83 (2016).  
 95 How the EU Court proposal will be integrated with the current system of in-
ternational arbitration, where the court in the place of arbitration has the potential 
to set aside the award on grounds specified under local arbitration law, is not alto-
gether clear.  The assumption is that once the appellate system is in place it will 
supplant review in local courts, yet it seems that those arbitrations will still have a 
“place” for purposes of judicial assistance to arbitration, for example.  CETA pro-
vides that the disputing party must not seek to set aside the award once the appel-
late body structure is fully in place: “Upon adoption of the decision [setting out the 
functioning of the Appellate Tribunal]: (b) a disputing party shall not seek to re-
view, set aside, annul, revise or initiate any other similar procedure as regards an 
award under this Section . . . .”  CETA, supra note 71, art. 8.28.9(b).  Whether parties 
will necessarily abide by this stricture, and whether local courts will necessarily 
dismiss a set-aside application if one is made, may well be put into question.   
 96 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, supra note 1, art. 54.1. 
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entitled to immunity, unless they are used for commercial pur-
poses.97  This hurdle must be faced against any state respondent, but 
might be particularly difficult against the European Union.  To be 
sure, this issue would arise only if the European Union refused to 
pay an award rendered against it, and the European Union has 
pledged to honour any such awards.98  Yet any potential judgment 
creditor would likely want to know what its avenue for redress is in 
the event the European Union did not pay voluntarily. 
 One question is how many commercial assets the European Un-
ion holds outside the Union in states that are a party to the New 
York Convention.  Within the European Union itself, no award 
against the European Union can be enforced, unless the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Union (“CJEU”) approves it:  “The property and 
assets of the Union shall not be the subject of any administrative or 
legal measure of constraint without the authorisation of the Court of 
Justice.”99 
 Given the European Union’s view that EU law is primary and its 
refusal to endorse the payment of any arbitral award that could be 
construed as giving state aid to an investor, one might well question 
whether voluntary payment would always be forthcoming.  For ex-
ample, the European Union directed Romania not to pay an award 
rendered against it in Micula v. Romania on the grounds that the 
award constituted an effective payment of the state aid that Roma-
nia withdrew from Micula and for which it was ordered to pay com-
pensation.100  CETA itself attempts to avoid this potential problem 
by making explicit that withdrawals or refusals to renew subsidies 
cannot be the subject of investment arbitrations under the agree-
ment.101  But given likely differences of opinion about what consti-
tutes state aid, it is entirely possible to envision an investment award 
                                               
 97 See generally Andrea K. Bjorklund, State Immunity and the Enforcement of Inves-
tor-State Arbitral Awards, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, 302 (Christina Binder et al., eds., 2009). 
 98 CETA, supra note 71, art. 8.41.2. 
 99 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Protocol [No. 7] on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the European Union, 2008 O.J. (C 310/261), art. 1.   
 100 Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1470, Micula v. Romania, Arbitral Award, 
(Mar. 30, 2015), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con-
tent/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32015D1470 [https://perma.cc/W6FG-MJ95]. 
 101 CETA, supra note 71, art. 8.9.3–4. 
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that the European Union, or the CJEU, or both, would regard as un-
payable. 
 At present, it would be difficult for an investment court to be 
adopted as part of ICSID Convention regime given the Convention’s 
incompatibility with an appellate mechanism and the inability of the 
European Union to become a member.   Should ICSID be able to 
surmount these incompatibilities, perhaps by amendment or per-
haps by the addition of a protocol to ICSID Convention that estab-
lished a parallel mechanism for investment court arbitrations and 
which would permit the European Union to become a party (an 
“ICSID II”), it would reinforce its position of market dominance.102  
Even without those changes, however, ICSID could oversee an in-
vestment court system whose awards were enforceable under the 
New York Convention.  Moreover, given the time it is likely to take 
for any court system to be established, ICSID will continue to ad-
minister investment treaty arbitrations under the regime foreseen by 
existing investment agreements, and investment arbitrations under 
investment contracts and investment legislation remain an im-
portant part of ICSID’s workload. 
 
 
 
4.3.  Potential Disruption from Other Regional Sources 
 
 ICSID will face competition whether or not the EU proposal 
comes to fruition.  The Permanent Court of Arbitration is one insti-
tution that might be expected to challenge ICSID’s hegemony in in-
vestor-state arbitration.  Indeed, the PCA is currently overseeing 
                                               
 102 It should be noted, however, that similar problems regarding execution im-
munity would remain, because Article 55 of the ICSID Convention explicitly main-
tains execution immunity.  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 
supra note 1, art. 55 (“Nothing in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating from 
the law in force in any Contracting State relating to immunity of that State or of any 
foreign State from execution.”). 
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several investor-state arbitrations103 and has a long pedigree in ad-
ministering public-international law based disputes.104  Another is 
the Singapore International Arbitration Centre which, under the 
leadership of its new President, Gary Born, has established special-
ized rules under which investment arbitrations can proceed as of 
January 1, 2017.105  Singapore has already built, in a relatively short 
time, an outstanding reputation as a center for commercial arbitra-
tion.  The reasons for Singapore’s success include the robust support 
of the Singaporean government, Singapore’s status as an Asian 
transport and commercial hub, and its strong and predicable legal 
framework.106  It is also important to underscore the shift of the 
                                               
 103 See Permanent Court of Arbitration, PCA Case Repository, 
http://www.pcacases.com/web/allcases/[https://perma.cc/HBJ3-44N5] (last 
visited Feb. 9, 2018). 
 104 See Permanent Court of Arbitration, About Us, 
http://www.pcacases.com/web/aboutus/ [https://perma.cc/5ACJ-AWZG] 
(“Established in 1899 to facilitate arbitration and other forms of dispute resolution 
between states, the PCA has developed into a modern, multi-faceted arbitral insti-
tution that is now perfectly situated at the juncture between public and private in-
ternational law to meet the rapidly evolving dispute resolution needs of the inter-
national community.  Today the PCA provides services for the resolution of 
disputes involving various combinations of states, state entities, intergovernmental 
organizations, and private parties.”); see also BROOKS W. DALY, EVGENIYA 
GORIATCHEVA & HUGH A. MEIGHEN, A GUIDE TO THE PCA ARBITRATION RULES 16–26, 
¶¶ 3.01–3.24 (2014). 
 105 SIAC, SIAC IA Rules 2017, supra note 14. 
 106 According to the SIAC website, the reasons for Singapore’s success are as 
follows: 
An independent neutral third-country venue consistently ranked in the 
top 5 for the least corrupt public sector in the world in the Corruption Per-
ceptions Index. Singapore is also consistently ranked no. 1 for the least 
corrupt public sector in Asia in the Corruption Perceptions Index. 
• A strong multicultural society, with excellent legal and technological ex-
pertise as well as language fluency. 
• A central location in Southeast Asia with 6,600 scheduled flights a week 
to 320 cities. 
• An open economy and business environment that is host to over 7,000 
multinational firms. 
• The UNCITRAL Model Law is the cornerstone of Singapore's legislation 
on international commercial arbitration which is regularly updated to in-
corporate internationally accepted codes and rules for arbitration. 
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global economy to the Asia-Pacific region as businesses tend to think 
and act regionally; regional disputes are increasingly likely to be set-
tled in the Asia-Pacific region as opposed to Europe or North Amer-
ica.107 
 The Kuala Lumpur Regional Center for Arbitration (“KLRCA”)108 
is another potential challenger in the Asia region.  The KLRCA is an 
international organization established in 1978 under the auspices of 
                                               
• A party to the 1958 New York Convention (on enforcement of arbitration 
awards). Singapore arbitration awards are enforceable in over 150 coun-
tries worldwide. 
• A strong tradition of the rule of law, supported by a highly skilled judi-
ciary that receives top rankings in international surveys. 
• The Courts offer maximum judicial support of arbitration and minimum 
intervention granting parties full and consistent support in the conduct of 
international arbitration. 
• Parties have a freedom of choice of counsel in arbitration proceedings 
regardless of nationality. 
• There is no restriction on foreign law firms engaging in and advising on 
arbitration in Singapore. 
• Non–residents do not require work permits to carry out arbitration ser-
vices in Singapore. 
• There are excellent facilities and services to support the conduct of arbi-
tration at Maxwell Chambers, Asia’s largest fully-integrated dispute reso-
lution complex with state-of-the-art hearing facilities. 
• Lower costs than in almost any other major center of arbitration. 
SAIC, Arbitration in Singapore, http://www.siac.org.sg/2014-11-03-13-33-43/why-
siac/arbitration-in-singapore [https://perma.cc/3MHH-JSES] (last visited Mar. 5, 
2018). 
 107 See Julien Chaisse, The Shifting Tectonics of International Investment Law—
Structure and Dynamics of Rules and Arbitration on Foreign Investment in the Asia-Pa-
cific Region, 47 G.W. INT’L L. REV. 563–638 (2015); see also Jonathan Choo, The Rise and 
Rise of Singapore: Singapore as a Preferred Venue for International Arbitration, 
SINGAPORE LAW GAZETTE (June 15, 2015), https://singaporeinternationalarbitra-
tion.com/2015/06/15/the-rise-and-rise-of-singapore-singapore-as-a-preferred-
venue-for-international-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/4SYN-VGUF].  Talk of a 
potential Asian Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ACSID”) under the 
aegis of China’s One Belt One Road Initiative illustrates the potential impact of a 
shift in economic focus. 
 108 See Kuala Lumpur Reginal Centre for Arbitration, KLRCA Arbitration Rules of 
2017, http://klrca.org/ [https://perma.cc/8D6J-KQXJ] (last visited Mar. 5, 2018). 
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/3
  
2018] Institutional Lock-in Within Investment Arbitration 743 
 
the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organisation (“AALCO”).109  
The KLRCA was the first regional center established by AALCO in 
Asia to provide institutional support as a neutral and independent 
venue for the conduct of domestic and international arbitration pro-
ceedings in Asia.  Its caseload has increased considerably in the last 
five years.  In addition, recent investment treaties explicitly refer to 
the KLRCA for the settlement of investment disputes.  In particular, 
Article 33 of Section B of the 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Invest-
ment Agreement allows them to be referred to, inter alia, the 
KLRCA.110  The KLRCA’s status as an international organization 
and its location in Malaysia—a multicultural state with a true de-
mocracy—might also make it attractive to a number of South East 
Asian and South Asian states.111 
 The PCA, the Singapore International Arbitration Centre, and the 
KLRCA are not the only potential rivals to ICSID.112  Indeed, there 
are far too many to list here.  The Arbitration Institute of the Stock-
holm Chamber of Commerce has some specialty in arbitrations in-
volving Russia and former Soviet and Soviet satellite states and in-
troduced a few investment-treaty-arbitration provisions in 
Appendix III of its 2017 SCC Arbitral Rules. 113  CIETAC also 
                                               
 109 See Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization, About AALCO, 
http://www.aalco.int/scripts/view-posting.asp?recordid=1 
[https://perma.cc/4H95-PRQC] (last visited Mar. 5, 2018).   
 110 The 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement is a multilateral in-
vestment treaty between all member States of ASEAN, which comprises Brunei, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, and Thai-
land. Section B of the 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement pro-
vides for the resolution of investment disputes between an investor and a member 
State.  For a detailed commentary on the ACUA, see JULIEN CHAISSE & SUFIAN JUSOH, 
THE ASEAN COMPREHENSIVE INVESTMENT AGREEMENT: THE REGIONALIZATION OF 
LAWS AND POLICY ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 265 (Edward Elgar Publ’g, 2016). 
 111 The degree to which the KLRCA is wholly free from political influence re-
mains, however, unclear—a point that should be noted. 
 112 This is not an “either/or” proposition.  These institutions are both competi-
tors and collaborators.   
113 Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, 2017 Arbitra-
tion Rules, (Jan. 1, 2017), http://sccinstitute.com/media/169838/arbitra-
tion_rules_eng_17_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/TRH5-HRJ2]. 
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adopted new rules for investment disputes in 2017.114  Dubai and 
Mauritius have relatively new arbitration centers.  The International 
Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration, the London Court of 
International Arbitration, and the Hong Kong International Arbitra-
tion Centre (which has recently invited practitioners to opine on 
whether it should develop investment arbitration rules)115 are all ca-
pable of administering investment disputes, though they are better 
known for commercial cases. 
 Several Latin American countries, led by Ecuador, have proposed 
the establishment of a regional arbitral institution to hear invest-
ment arbitrations involving members of the Union of South Ameri-
can Nations (“UNASUR”).116 
 The UNASUR proposal in particular demonstrates the introduc-
tion of a preference for regionally based dispute settlement for dis-
putes emanating from that region.  Whether any preference for re-
gionally based investment arbitration will emerge in Asia is not clear, 
given the paucity of investment arbitration cases involving Asian 
states.  One might imagine that China, given its “one belt, one road” 
policy, would seek to establish an Asian arbitration center.  If it were 
to do so, would it regard Singapore or Kuala Lumpur or Hong Kong 
as an appropriate venue, or would it prefer a Chinese location? 
 
4.4.  Judicial Disruptions 
 
                                               
114 Kate Apostolova, 2017 Year-in-Review: Top 5 in International Arbitration, 
WOLTERS KLUWER: KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Dec. 28, 2017), http://arbitra-
tionblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/12/28/2017-year-review-top-5-interna-
tional-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/UC5T-ECLJ]. 
115 Id. 
 116 See International Institute for Sustainable Development [IISD], News in Brief: 
UNASUR Arbitration Centre One Step Closer to Being Established, 7 INV. TREATY NEWS 
9, 10 (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/02/iisd-itn-february-2016-english.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Q9J-
DZH8]. 
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 One of ICSID’s primary advantages—the virtual automatic en-
forceability of ICSID awards—should help it to maintain its posi-
tion, yet even there some uncertainties exist.117  Romania and the 
European Union challenged the enforceability of an ICSID Conven-
tion Award in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, after 
having established at the District Court that they could seek enforce-
ment on an ex parte basis, which is the process generally applicable 
to court decisions of other U.S. courts.118  On appeal the Second Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act re-
quired service of process on the foreign sovereign.119  This result 
does not prevent the enforcement of the award, but makes the pro-
cess more cumbersome.  One of the claims put forward by the Euro-
pean Union in its amicus curiae brief is that the act-of-state doctrine 
should render the ICSID Convention award unenforceable because 
the award imposes liability on Romania in a manner that violates 
EU laws on state aid.120  If Romania and the European Union were 
to be successful on their claims, the enforceability of ICSID Conven-
tion awards would be undermined even outside EU member 
states—it is already quite clear that the Micula award, for example, 
will not be enforced in European Union, notwithstanding its status 
as an ICSID Convention award.  Incidentally, should the act-of-state 
doctrine be found available to be interposed by a state as a defense 
to enforcement in the ICSID Convention context, logic would sug-
gest that the argument would be available in defenses to the enforce-
ment of New York Convention awards as well.  But there are already 
                                               
 117 Execution immunity, discussed above in the context of New York Conven-
tion enforcement, is also applicable in the ICSID Convention Context.  Article 55 of 
the ICSID Convention specifically conserves execution immunity.  See Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, supra note 1; T-TIP Proposal, supra notes 
73, 91. 
 118 Micula v. Romania, No. 15 Misc. 107 (Part I), 2015 WL 4643180, at *3–4 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2015), rev’d, No. 15-3109-cv, 2017 WL 4772435 (2d Cir. Oct. 23, 
2017).  
119 Micula v. Romania, No. 15-3109-cv, 2017 WL 4772435, at *6 (2d. Cir. Oct. 23, 
2017). 
 120 Brief for Amicus Curiae the Commission of the European Union, Micula v. 
Romania, (2017) (No. 15-3109-cv), 2017 WL 4772435 (Feb. 4, 2016). 
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some limited grounds on which states can challenge the enforce-
ment of New York Convention awards, so the effect on enforceabil-
ity is much greater vis-à-vis the ICSID Convention. 
 
 
 
4.5.  Reasons to Expect the Continued Dominance of ICSID 
 
 If and when these challenges to ICSID’s hegemony ripen, one 
might still expect ICSID to remain dominant for many years.  The 
investment treaty network comprises approximately 2,700 treaties 
currently in force121 and ICSID Convention arbitration is an option 
under most of them (and ICSID Additional Facility arbitration is 
available in some cases as well); whereas the arbitration centers 
mentioned above are much more rarely included as options alt-
hough some treaties would permit the disputing parties to select an-
other set of rules even if they were not listed in the treaty.  ICSID is 
thus well entrenched in the existing network of investment treaties.  
This widespread treaty “pre-installment” only reinforces institu-
tional lock-in.  If treaties are unilaterally terminated, most have a 
survival clause providing that the investor may seek the protection 
of the treaty for a specified period—often twenty years—which sug-
gests that any wholesale change will not come soon.122  In addition, 
                                               
 121 See UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements Navigator, UNCTAD: INV. 
POL’Y HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA [https://perma.cc/25AY-
GUFQ] (last visited Mar. 5, 2018).  These 2,700 hundred are the BITs and interna-
tional investment agreements that have entered into force.  Others are pending.  At 
the end of 2014, UNCTAD identified a total of 3,271 international investment agree-
ments.  UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment 
Governance 106 (2015), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZRA4-FYU3] (“The conclusion in 2014 of 31 international in-
vestment agreements (IIAs) —18 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and 13 ‘other 
IIAs’—brought the total number of IIAs to 3,271 (2,926 BITs and 345 ‘other IIAs’) 
by year-end . . . .”). 
 122 An open question is the effect on investors’ rights if both states to the treaty 
terminate the treaty, and in so doing terminate the survival clause.  Do states retain 
that power, or does the investor have vested rights that cannot be ousted by such 
an agreement?  For a provocative study of this issue, see Anthea Roberts, Triangular 
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investment arbitrations brought under the aegis of investment con-
tracts and investments laws are likely to continue. 
 Second, even if one were to see the shift from the current ap-
proach to investment arbitration to the EU court approach, ICSID is 
likely to play at least some—and possibly a dominant—role there as 
well.  The ICSID Secretariat has already been named as the admin-
istrator for CETA investor-state arbitrations even if they do not oc-
cur under the auspices of the ICSID Convention. 
 Third, any shift is likely to be slow in coming.  Incremental 
change will not immediately displace the ICSID Convention, and 
even the establishment of a multilateral investment court would not 
immediately displace the existing regime.  Countries would have to 
sign on to the new court regime, and the ratification of international 
treaties tends to be a slow process.  For example, the United Nations 
Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investment Arbitra-
tion (the “Mauritius Convention”), which is frequently invoked as a 
likely model for the establishment of an investment court in order 
for disputes under existing treaties to feed in to the new system, took 
nearly three years to enter into force.123  It still has only three state 
parties.124 
 Fourth, should there be a growing demand for regionally based 
investment arbitration, it is not necessarily the case that ICSID can-
not dominate that market as well.  The ICSID Secretariat staff hail 
from dozens of countries.125  ICSID has cooperation agreements with 
                                               
Treaties: The Nature and Limits of Investment Treaty Rights, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353 
(2015). 
 123 United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investment Ar-
bitration, Dec. 10, 2014, U.N. Doc. No. 69/116, https://www.un-
citral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/transparency-convention/Transpar-
ency-Convention-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5XX-5H8J]. 
 124 The parties are Canada, Mauritius, and Switzerland.  UNCITRAL, Status: 
United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration 
(New York, 2014), http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitra-
tion/2014Transparency_Convention_status.html [https://perma.cc/9ECY-4YSA] 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2018). 
 125 See ICSID, Secretariat, https://ic-
sid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/about/Pages/Secretariat.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/93Q3-WEQU] (‘The Secretariat consists of approximately 70 
staff of diverse backgrounds and nationalities.”) (last visited Mar. 27, 2018). 
 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
  
748 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 39:3 
 
multiple institutions around the world, including CIETAC, SIAC, 
the HKIAC, and the KLRCA,126 and many others as well.  ICSID thus 
has venues around the world in which it can administer arbitrations.  
Indeed, should there be the requisite demand, nothing would stop 
ICSID from establishing a regional branch, in China or elsewhere. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
 Long-term projections are always hard to make.  Will investment 
arbitration even continue as a viable form of dispute settlement at 
all?  Its availability in some 2,700 extant treaties suggests it will last 
for some time, but the pace of treaty negotiation has slowed and, as 
discussed, whether the European Union and the United States will 
continue to negotiate investment treaties and FTAs with investment 
chapters in them, either with each other or with third states, is not 
certain.  If they do, these treaties will not necessarily offer the possi-
bility of investor-state arbitration.  The European Union’s proposal 
to establish a court could be viewed as saving investment arbitra-
tion, but by many critics it will be viewed as not going far enough.127  
On the other hand, “state-friendly” modifications to investment 
treaties have made it harder for investors to prevail on their 
claims.128  Nonetheless, one should recall that at its founding, ICSID 
was expected to administer disputes arising under investment con-
tracts, not investment treaties.  Thus, while investment treaty arbi-
tration has eclipsed contract arbitration in ICSID’s workload,129 con-
tractual arbitrations will likely continue.  ICSID does not have a 
                                               
 126 See ISCID, Other Facilities, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/ser-
vices/Other-Facilities.aspx [https://perma.cc/35XZ-B56E] (last visited Mar. 27, 
2018). 
 127  See Andrea K. Bjorklund, The European Union’s Proposal for an Investment 
Court and its Implications for the Future of International Investment Law (unpublished 
manuscript on file with Authors).  
 128  Lars A. Markert & Catharine Titi, States Strike Back—Old and New Ways for 
Host States to Defend Against Investment Arbitrations, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY, 401, 401-435 (Andrea K. Bjorklund ed., 2015).  
 129 ICSID statistics indicate that overall, the basis of consent invoked to establish 
ICSID jurisdiction in registered ICSID cases was found in an investment contract 
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monopoly over them, either, but the same network externalities and 
market dominance characteristics apply in that area as well. 
 In sum, if the European Union’s proposals for an investment 
court gain traction, and if eventually that court crystallizes into a 
multilateral facility that is headquartered in another institution out-
side ICSID, that institution could eventually rival ICSID for invest-
ment arbitration dominance.  Such an event would constitute a “dis-
ruptive event” sufficient to undermine the institutional lock-in that 
we posit currently exists.  We may thus witness a period of institu-
tional break-out wherein the market dominance of ICSID is destabi-
lized.  Even aside from the European Union’s activities, other exist-
ing and even new institutions will continue to compete with ICSID, 
and one or more of them could eventually erode ICSID’s market 
dominance.  Exogenous factors, such as national court decisions that 
undermine the enforceability of ICSID Convention awards, could 
accelerate that process.  Other unforeseen events might also under-
mine the market dominance of ICSID and trigger either a large-scale 
coalescence around an alternative institution or, rather more likely, 
the parceling out of investment arbitration among multiple compet-
itors until the market again coalesces around a new standard.  Such 
a scenario might mean ICSID remains the single most dominant 
market force for a period, albeit without a monopoly or quasi-mo-
nopoly.  Yet, absent a very powerful exogenous shock, ICSID’s in-
stitutional strength and its network-effect-reinforced position of 
dominance will be hard to unseat. 
 
                                               
between the investor and the host state in only 17.3 percent of the cases.  The basis 
for consent was found in the domestic law of the host state in 9.3 percent of the 
cases while the basis for consent in the other cases was found in a BIT (60.3 percent) 
or another investment agreement.  In 2015, the basis of consent invoked to establish 
ICSID jurisdiction in registered ICSID cases was found in an investment contract 
between the investor and the host state in only 8 percent of the cases.  The basis for 
consent was found in the domestic law of the host state in 8 percent of the cases 
while the basis for consent in the other cases was found in a BIT (46 percent) or 
another investment agreement.  See ICSID, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. 
DISPUTES [ICSID], THE ICSID CASELOAD–STATISTICS (ISSUE 2016-1) 10 chart 4, 23 chart 
3 (2016), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/re-
sources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202016-1%20(English)%20final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7XF5-ZGF5]. 
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